NHA: A Dream of Reform or a Harvest of Power? By: Abid Rasheed

The National Highway Authority is not merely the name of an office, a road, or a project. It is the lifeline of the country on which trade, travel, defense, and everyday life depend. But when one places a hand on a lifeline and feels not a pulse but a grip, the question arises: is the problem one of health—or of intent?

Under the National Highway Authority (Amendment) Act 2024, the decision to convert NHA into a State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) appeared, at first glance, to carry the fragrance of reform, transparency, and corporate governance. Yet as time has passed, internal sources, employees, and private-sector stakeholders have begun to view it as a mirror reflecting not reform, but signs of capture, political interference, and a deteriorating legal and administrative order.

It is often said that the law is a lamp—but a lamp only shows the way when the person holding it does not benefit from the darkness. In the case of NHA, the question grows louder: was the SOE lamp truly lit, or was it merely used as a curtain?

Within administrative circles, there is growing discussion that the SOE transition is being deliberately used in a way that sidelines legal forums, weakens the cadre-based professional system, and concentrates authority in political and bureaucratic rooms that have no legal mandate to run NHA’s administrative, financial, or operational affairs.

According to legal experts, the core issue is not an allegation but a constitutional ambiguity: where does the National Highway Authority (Amendment) Act 2024 state that the Federal Minister or Federal Secretary for Communications may bypass the National Highway Council (NHC) and the National Highway Executive Board (NHEB) to directly run NHA affairs? The law neither dissolves these bodies, nor permits a parallel command structure, nor reduces the CEO of NHA to a mere signing authority. Yet internal circles maintain that this is precisely what is happening in practice. Thus, under the banner of SOE reform, the very pillar of corporate governance—on which transparency was to be built—appears hollowed out.

Another dark stain on NHA’s internal map is the vacant position of Member Administration. This is no ordinary post; it is the doorway through which institutional discipline enters. Sources say that a senior and competent officer is available within the organization, yet the seat remains vacant. The impression is that the issue is not competence or experience, but personal preference. When decisions are driven by temperament rather than law, institutions become boats without sails. This raises an unavoidable question: is NHA being run according to law, merit, and institutional need—or according to the personal priorities of a few individuals? Keeping a key legal post deliberately vacant despite the availability of a qualified officer may collide with court rulings, service rules, and institutional discipline—at least in principle.

When it comes to funds, the metaphor becomes even clearer. Money allocated for roads is the seed from which the crop of development should grow. But when questions arise that these seeds are being sown in unrelated fields, both the farmer and the land grow anxious. Among stakeholders, there is active debate over where the SOE framework allows national highway funds to be spent on projects with no direct connection to roads. Some circles even allege that the use of road funds has benefited private commercial interests. If these claims prove to be more than mere rumors, legal experts argue they could fall under the categories of malfeasance and abuse of authority.

The soul of any institution lies in its people. When high-performing officers are sidelined instead of being appreciated, the message is clear: integrity has a price here. According to employees, officers who successfully completed the Thakot–Havelian CPEC project—one of the most challenging motorway projects—were made Officers on Special Duty (OSD) instead of being rewarded. This action was allegedly taken on verbal instructions. Employees see this as punishment for professional integrity. It feels as though the institution would rather break the mirror than look into it.

Critics describe the influx of deputation officers as “cadre substitution.” The issue is not that every external officer is incompetent; the real question is under which legal rules, and by setting aside which principles, NHA’s internal cadre has been ignored. When engineers are sidelined in an engineering institution and officers from unrelated services are placed in front, mechanical friction is inevitable. Employees view this as a systematic disempowerment of capable officers.

Legal circles present a simple yet weighty demand: the CEO of NHA should submit a sworn statement before the court or parliament declaring that no competent, experienced, or suitable officer was available for these positions. An affidavit is the scale that weighs intent against action. Without it, appointments give rise to suspicions of bad faith—not accusations, but serious questions.

Discussions around ethical corruption and misuse of authority are no longer limited to whispers. Sources are demanding investigations into issues such as misuse of official tours, the presence of irrelevant officers in field matters, and pressure on subordinate staff. Observers note that unchecked authority is like leaving a cat to guard milk—the outcome is predictable.

In this context, questions are also being raised about vehicles, monetization, and personal use. If an officer simultaneously enjoys official facilities and benefits from monetization, how does this appear in the mirror of financial rules? These are questions, not accusations—but they demand answers.

This issue has now moved beyond office corridors. The Senate Standing Committee on Communications has taken notice of mismanagement and alleged misuse. Demands for independent, transparent, and impartial audits have emerged. The committee’s remarks reflect a sense that investigations can no longer be delayed. Parliamentary oversight is the scale by which a state weighs its institutions.

The silence of accountability bodies is also under scrutiny—particularly regarding motorway service areas, tourism projects, conversion of historical buildings, and toll operations. Even concerns raised by international financial institutions over governance have failed to accelerate reform, which remains an open question.

In the end, the demand is the same as in every serious state: forensic audits, legal scrutiny, and transparency. If the Road Maintenance Account ledger is examined independently and according to law, the truth will speak for itself—a ledger needs only eyes to speak, not ears.

NHA controls thousands of kilometers of highways, projects worth billions, and bears a strategic responsibility. It is a national asset, not a personal estate. A senior engineer’s remark that “under the law, the accomplice of a thief is also a thief” is not an allegation—it is a warning. The question now stands before the state: will the SOE framework become a means of reform for NHA, or a field for harvesting power? The answer will be given by the law—if the law is allowed to speak.